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Human Capital and Post-Displacement Outcomes
*
 
We investigate whether the costs of job displacement differ between blue collar and white 
collar workers. In the short run earnings and employment losses are substantial for both 
groups but stronger for white collar workers. In the long run, there are only weak effects for 
blue collar workers but strong and persistent effects for white collars. This is consistent with 
the idea that firm-specific human capital and internal labor markets are more important in 
white-collar than in blue collar jobs. 
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The loss of a job is certainly shaking up someone's career temporarily, but
might also be a long-term problem. To which extent does the type of a
worker's job a®ect the costs of displacement? Theoretical arguments suggest
that losing a job associated with ¯rm-speci¯c human capital is more costly
in terms of reduced lifetime earnings than losing a job where pay is closely
aligned with a worker's general human capital. Similarly, workers who are
displaced from manual work, maybe with piece rate compensation, are less
likely to su®er substantial lifetime earnings losses than those displaced from
their career path on internal labor markets associated with deferred payment
contracts.
This paper looks at displacement costs for two broad occupational groups:
white and blue collar workers. Arguably, ¯rm-speci¯c human capital, internal
labor markets, and career concerns are much more important in white than in
blue collar jobs. When displacement costs are driven by loss of ¯rm-speci¯c
rents we should observe higher displacement costs for white than for blue
collar workers. (Lazear, 1979)
The issue has not been resolved in the empirical literature: The authors
of country chapters in the book by Kuhn (2002) compare displacement costs
across a number of countries and ¯nd no di®erence for earnings losses across
education categories. The displacement costs with respect to unemployment
are mixed: In the U.S., Canada, France and Belgium, more educated workers
(who are more frequently found in white collar jobs) tend to su®er less from
joblessness after displacement, the reverse is true for Germany.1
We use exceptional administrative data, the Austrian Social Security
Database (ASSD), to shed new light on the issue. This data set has three
main advantages: First, it covers the universe of Austrian employees in the
private sector. Second, it contains high-quality and high-frequency infor-
mation on the individual workers' earnings and employment history over an
extended period of time. Third, it contains an employer identi¯er that allows
1Podgursky and Swaim (1987) explicitly consider a white-blue collar comparison: they
¯nd lower earnings losses for white collars using the Displaced Worker Survey.
1us to identify plant closures. Furthermore, as Austrian blue and white collar
workers are subject to di®erent social security rules measurement error in
occupational status can be ruled out.
Taking plant closures as an indicator for exogenous job separations we are
able to identify the causal e®ect of displacement on worker's future careers.
Our empirical strategy exploits the rich nature of our data and applies exact
matching techniques which makes treatment and control groups extremely
well comparable.
Our ¯ndings point to large and persistent employment and earnings losses
for white collar workers, but more transient and much smaller losses for blue
collars. This is consistent with the idea that internal labor markets and ¯rm-
speci¯c wage policies are more common among white collar workers compared
to blue collars.
2 Data
Our data comprise all private sector workers in Austria covered by the social
security system.2 All employment records can be linked to establishment
identi¯ers. We use quarterly information from 1978-98 for daily employ-
ment and wages. This information is highly reliable, because social security
payments hinge on these data.
We use workers employed between 1982 and 1988 at risk of a plant closure.
This allows to observe workers' earnings and employment histories 4 years
prior to potential displacement up to 10 years afterwards. We restrict the
analysis to prime-age workers (age 35 - 50) with at least one year of tenure,
who were employed in ¯rms with more than 5 employees at least in one
quarter during the period 1982-88, excluding the construction or tourism
industry.
In the ASSD, each establishment has an identi¯er. Exits of establishments
occur when the employer identi¯er ceases to exist. Some of these cases might
not be true closures and (most of the) employees just continue under a new
identi¯er. Therfore, we impose a further restriction: If more than 50% of the
2See ZweimÄ uller et al. (2008) for a description of the data.
2employees continue under a new employer identi¯er we do not consider this
to be a closure.
Our treatment group comprises 9,656 workers who experienced a plant
closure between 1982 and 1988. Our control group comprises about 1 million
workers from establishments not going bust during this period. To increase
the comparability between treated and controls, we perform exact matching
between treated and control subjects on the following criteria: sex, age, broad
occupation (blue or white collar), location of ¯rm (9 provinces), industry (30
industries), employment history in the eight quarters before plant closure.3
We do almost exact matching on continuous variables: average daily wages in
the quarters 8, 9, 10 and 11 before plant closure are matched by decile group4
and plant size two years before plant closure is matched by quartile groups.
Applying this matching procedure allows us to identify at least one control
subject for 5,570 treated subjects, which are matched to 30,156 controls.
3 Econometric Strategy
To estimate the e®ect of an involuntary job loss on earnings and employment
prospects we specify the following model



















i;t + ¹i + µt + ²i;t; (1)
Yi;t denotes the outcome variable (employment status or earnings) of individ-
ual i at quarter t, BLUEi is a dummy variable indicating whether individual
i is a blue collar worker, PCi is another dummy variable indicating whether
individual i got displaced due to a plant closure and the Qi;t's are two dum-
mies indicating the time period relative to plant closure (actual or potential).
3See Ichino et al. (2007) for a detailed description of the matching algorithm.
4We do not match earnings close to closure, because of anticipatory wage e®ects. See
Jacobson et al. (1993) for evidence on such e®ects.
3To keep the problem manageable and results easily interpretable, we focus
on two post-displacement periods: the "short-run", de¯ned as the ¯rst ¯ve
years (20 quarters, Q
1;20
i;t ) after potential displacement; and the "long-run"
as years 6-10 after potential displacement (Q
21;40
i;t ). Moreover, speci¯cation
(1) includes a constant term, ®, individual ¯xed e®ects, ¹i, calendar time
e®ects, µt and an error term, ²i;t.
The parameters of interest are ¯1;20 and ¯21;40. They identify, for short-
and long-run labor market outcomes, whether blue collar workers su®er more
(¯1;20 < 0; ¯21;40 < 0) or less from a plant closure than white collars.
4 Results
Figure 1 visualizes the evolution of earnings and employment by broad oc-
cupation and displacement status. Panel A shows employment pro¯les for
displaced (treated) and non-displaced (control) white collar workers. The
graph shows mean employment rates per quarter over 14 years { 4 years
before and 10 years after potential displacement. By construction, employ-
ment rates are equal to unity in the year prior to potential displacement.
Employment rates at earlier dates show that our matching procedure works
well: During quarters -16 to -5 employment rates of treated and controls are
identical. Immediately after displacement employment rates for the treated
white collar workers decrease sharply. Only about 50 percent ¯nd a new
job during the ¯rst quarter after displacement. Employment rates catch up
during the ¯rst two years and decrease thereafter but never reach the level
of the non-displaced.
Panel B shows the corresponding picture for blue collar workers. The im-
mediate loss in employment rates after displacement is somewhat higher for
displaced blue collars. However, displaced blue collars recover much faster
and, about 6 years after displacement, reach a level only slightly below the
employment of non-displaced blue collars. In sum, the graphical analysis
shows that employment losses of displaced white collar workers are perma-
nent and strong. In contrast, employment losses for displaced blue collars
are more temporary and small in the long run.
4Panels C and D portray the analogous phenomenon for the evolution of
workers' earnings. The numbers show mean nominal daily earnings, condi-
tional on employment. Obviously, this measure changes over time due to
increases in real earnings, in in°ation and because the set of employed work-
ers changes. As in panels A and B, we see a remarkable di®erence between
white and blue collar workers. Wages for displaced blue collar workers are
only slightly below those of non-displaced blue collars throughout the post-
plant closure period. In contrast, earnings pro¯les of displaced white collar
workers are substantially below those of their non-displaced colleagues and
remain so throughout the post-plant closure period.
Table 1 presents regression results from equation (1), both for employ-
ment and daily wages. Columns (1) and (2) use employment status and
the wage as dependent variables. Individual ¯xed e®ects and dummies for
calendar time are included.
Displaced white collar workers face substantial employment losses equal
to a .231 reduction in the employment probability (coe±cient of PCiQ
1;20
i;t ) in
the short-run and a .137 reduction (PCiQ
21;40
i;t ) in the long-run. Displacement
e®ects for blue collars are much more moderate: employment probabilities
decrease by .149 (-.231 + .082) in the short-run and by .046 (-.137 + .091)
in the long-run.
Blue-white collar di®erences in earnings losses are even more striking.
Column (2) shows that earnings losses for displaced white collar are large
both in the short-run (-.079 log points, coe±cient of PCiQ
1;20
i;t ) and in the
long-run (-.078 log points, PCiQ
21;40
i;t ). In contrast, blue collar workers' earn-
ings drop by only .023 log-points (-.079 + .056) in the short-run and by
negligible .006 log-points (-.078 + .072) in the long-run.
5 Conclusion
We investigated whether costs of job displacement di®er by the nature of the
job. Our ¯ndings suggest that both white and blue collar workers experience
a decrease in employment rates and earnings in the short-run (the ¯rst ¯ve
years after displacement). However, for white collar workers these detrimen-
5tal short-run e®ects are much stronger. Moreover, for blue collar workers
employment losses are modest and earnings reductions are negligible in the
long-run (years 6-10 after displacement). In contrast, white collar workers
experience strongly negative employment and earnings e®ects also in the long
run.
Arguably, in white collar jobs career concerns, ¯rm-speci¯c human capi-
tal, and internal labor markets are more important than in blue collar jobs.
Blue collar workers do mostly manual work and are frequently paid piece
rates. Hence our results are consistent with the idea that displacement costs
are higher for workers displaced from jobs associated with more job-speci¯c
rents. Individuals losing such jobs are confronted with a worse position on
the labor market and experience a major disruption of their career path, not
only temporarily but also in the long run.
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F statistic 104.854 561.717
*All regressions include individual ¯xed e®ects and dummies for calendar time. Dependent
variables are an employment dummy in column 1 and log daily earnings in column 2.
Clustered standard errors reported in parenthesis.
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